In March 2026, an Indian gas tanker crept towards the Strait of Hormuz. Iran had
\nclosed the passage. Mines lay somewhere beneath her keel. Yet she sailed on. An
\nIndian warship guided her through, mile by mile, using hydrographic charts and
\nunbroken radio contact. Once she cleared the strait, destroyers took over the escort
\nand shepherded her home. The Indian Navy named it Operation Urja Suraksha. It
\nbegan on 23 March 2026. It has not stopped since.<\/p>\n
AI-generated summary, reviewed by editors<\/p>\n
Look closely at that tanker. She carried cooking gas for Indian kitchens. Her cargo
\nwas ordinary. Her escort was not. That contrast explains India's problem. The
\ncountry must build more aircraft carriers and more surface combatants. Moreover, it
\nmust decide now.<\/p>\n
India buys 88.7 per cent of its crude oil abroad, a record high as of 2025-26 – and
\nthe figure has kept climbing since. Most of it loads in the Gulf. Around 30 per cent of
\nthe world's seaborne crude squeezes through Hormuz every day.<\/p>\n
Consequently, India's petrol pumps, power plants and fertiliser units depend on a
\nchannel it does not control. Diplomacy can win permission to transit. Only warships
\ncan escort the ship once she enters the minefield.<\/p>\n
Alternatives exist on paper. Pipelines, strategic reserves and new suppliers all help.
\nNone of them, however, removes the need to protect a hull at sea. Shore-based
\nfighters cannot loiter over that water for long. Carriers can. A carrier battle group
\ncarries its own airfield, its own radar picture and its own refuelling aircraft. It parks
\npower exactly where the cargo is.<\/p>\n
Roughly 95 per cent of India's trade by volume moves by sea. About 70 per cent by
\nvalue does too. Nearly all of it passes through Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb or Malacca.
\nAttack any one gate and the bill lands in Indian homes. Since February 2026,
\nshipping lines have avoided both Suez and Hormuz. Ships now sail around the
\nCape, adding thousands of miles and a fortnight to each voyage. Freight rates climb.
\nInsurance follows.<\/p>\n
Malacca matters just as much. India's trade with East Asia funnels through that
\nnarrow corridor. So do coal cargoes, electronics and shipping bound for the Pacific.
\nWhoever watches Malacca watches half of India's commerce.<\/p>\n
Indian warships have therefore patrolled the Gulf of Aden since 2008 and Hormuz
\nsince 2019. Even now, the Navy keeps ships escorting merchantmen through both
\nchokepoints. Escorting, however, devours hulls. One ship on station demands two
\nmore behind her: one refitting, one working up.<\/p>\n
About 9 million Indians live in the Gulf. They send home nearly 40 per cent of India's
\nremittances. Millions more work across East Africa.<\/p>\n
When the shooting starts, airspace shuts first. The sea stays open, but not always.
\nDuring Operation Kaveri in 2023, INS Sumedha lifted 278 citizens out of Port Sudan
\nwhile runways burned, and naval ships ran several more such sorties as India
\nbrought home 3,862 people in total. Operation Sindhu, launched in Iran in 2025, tells
\nthe other half of the story: with the Navy's ships too far from Iran's interior to reach
\nmost evacuees, India leaned almost entirely on overland routes into Armenia and
\nTurkmenistan and on air bridges out of Yerevan, Ashgabat, Amman and Sharm el-
\nSheikh to bring home roughly 4,400 people. Kaveri shows what a hull already on
\nstation can do. Sindhu shows what happens when one isn't, the operation still
\nsucceeded, but only because neighbouring states and airspace stayed open long
\nenough for an airlift to work. That is an assumption India cannot always bank on.<\/p>\n
Each rescue needs presence nearby, whether naval or diplomatic, arranged well
\nbefore the crisis breaks. India cannot despatch a ship from Mumbai and hope to
\narrive in time.<\/p>\n
Undersea cables carry about 99 per cent of the world's internet traffic. In September
\n2025, cuts near Jeddah severed the SMW4 and IMEWE systems and slowed traffic
\nacross India and the Gulf.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, India's offshore rigs, floating terminals and new deep-water fields sit
\nexposed on open water. Drones and one-way boats now threaten them cheaply.
\nProtecting such assets demands persistent patrol, helicopters and sensors at sea.
\nWarships tied alongside protect nothing.<\/p>\n
Estimates of the Navy's current strength vary by what is counted, but most put its
\ncombat fleet in the range of 130 to 150 warships, with an official target of around 175
\nby 2035. China, by contrast, fields three carriers and more than 370 battle-force
\nhulls. Furthermore, it runs a base in Djibouti and has kept an escort task force off
\nAfrica since 2008.<\/p>\n