JPMorgan Chase Head of Consumer Fraud and Scam Prevention Darius Kingsley discusses bank scams in an interview with Kurt "CyberGuy" Knutsson for the "Beyond Connected" podcast.
Paul C. in Washington, D.C., received an alarming text claiming Apple Pay had already charged him $8,250 and another $8,250 would go through in 35 minutes. That is the kind of message designed to make your stomach drop before you have time to think.
Paul did the smart thing. He stopped, avoided the callback number and sent the text to us. Let's break down every red flag and show you how to verify a charge without handing control to a scammer.
New! Free live CyberGuy class: Protect Your Money From Today’s Biggest Threats
Join us Saturday, Aug. 29, at 10 a.m. ET for a free CyberGuy LIVE class covering five simple steps to help defend yourself against AI scams, fraud, identity theft and financial hacks. Kurt "CyberGuy" Knutsson will explain how to set up bank alerts, strengthen your account logins, protect your phone number, freeze your credit and help secure your retirement savings against unauthorized transfers. No technical experience is needed. You’ll also receive our financial protection checklist, and every registrant will get a link to the class recording afterward.
Reserve your free spot today at CyberGuyLive.com.
FAKE BOOKING.COM TRAVEL CREDIT SCAM TARGETS TRAVELERS
A scam text falsely warns of an $8,250 Apple Pay charge and threatens another $8,250 transaction within 35 minutes to pressure recipients into calling scammers. (Kurt "CyberGuy" Knutsson)
The message claimed $8,250 had already been charged through Apple Pay and warned that a duplicate $8,250 transaction would "auto-approve" in 35 minutes. It told Paul to call an 855 number, quote "Case CA-3321" and "verbally kill the pending charge." We partially masked the callback number so no one calls it accidentally.
The message looks chaotic, but nearly every phrase has a purpose. The sender uses dramatic wording, fake authority and a tight deadline to push Paul toward one action: calling the number in the text.
The message came from a number beginning with +44, the international calling code for the United Kingdom. Yet it claims to come from "Apple Pay Account Services" and tells Paul in Washington, D.C., to call a separate 855 toll-free number. A different callback number does not automatically prove fraud. However, an overseas sender directing a U.S. recipient to an unrelated support line should make you stop before calling.
The text uses the Apple Pay name several times and signs off as "Apple Pay Account Services." It also arrived as a blue iMessage with the word "Encrypted" shown beneath it. Those details can make the message feel official. However, encryption only means the message was protected while traveling between devices. It does not confirm that Apple sent it. The signature also sounds generic. It does not name Paul's bank, identify the card involved or provide an official Apple support channel.
The first line reads: "$8,250.00 APPLE PAY – 35-MINUTE DEADLINE." The message then claims $8,250 has already disappeared and warns that a duplicate $8,250 charge will be approved in 35 minutes. That raises the threatened loss to $16,500. The exact 35-minute deadline feels calculated. It gives Paul enough time to call while discouraging him from checking Wallet, opening his bank's app or asking someone else for advice.
The message says Paul's Apple Pay account has "hemorrhaged" money. It calls the situation a "catastrophic fraud event" and claims his contactless limit has been "crushed" to $0. It later tells him to "verbally kill the pending charge." Those words sound dramatic because they are meant to produce fear. A legitimate financial alert would normally use clear terms such as charged, declined, frozen or pending. It would not describe an account as hemorrhaging money or ask you to kill a charge.
The first transaction allegedly happened at: "an agricultural processing surplus in Stockton, CA." The second supposedly involved: "a payday lending chain in Modesto." Neither phrase identifies an actual merchant. They sound specific at first because they include industries and real California cities. However, they fall apart when you look closer. A legitimate transaction alert would usually show the merchant's name. It would not rely on vague descriptions such as "agricultural processing surplus."